Renouncing Faith at the Time of Death 

 

In the Name of God, the All-Beneficent, the Ever-Merciful.

May God’s blessings be upon Muḥammad and his purified progeny.

Among the well-known supplications is the plea:

“O Allah, I seek refuge in You from renouncing faith at the time of death.”

But what exactly is meant by renouncing faith (al-ʿadīla)?

 

Definition of Renouncing Faith

Al-Majlisī defined it as: “Turning away from the truth.”

Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn writes:

“Let us conclude this epistle with a blessed matter – namely, that renouncing faith at the time of death does indeed occur. Satan comes to the dying individual and leads him astray, seeking to sever him from faith, and as a result, he falls into the torment of Hellfire.”¹

Al-Tabrīzī Al-Anṣārī explained:

“Duʿāʾ al-ʿAdīla was prescribed as a way of warding off this calamity. The word ‘ʿadīla’ refers to a she-devil appointed by Iblīs to mislead the human being at the moment of death – turning him from true belief to falsehood. The term follows the morphological pattern faʿīlah in the sense of ‘object’ of the action, the mafʿūlah (i.e., one who is turned or deviated). Thereat, the intended meaning of the name of this supplication is ‘repelling the deviation at death.’ It may also be understood as the infinitive – i.e., the supplication of repelling the aforementioned deviation.”²

Shaykh ʿAbbās Al-Qummī stated:

“Renouncing faith at the time of death is when one turns away from truth to falsehood. It happens when Satan approaches the dying person, whispers into his heart, and causes him to doubt his religion – to lead him out of faith.”³

 

Causes of Renouncing Faith

Several factors can be considered as possible causes of al-ʿadīla. These include:

1. Treating prayer lightly:

It is reported from the Noble Prophet ﷺ, in reference to the Angel of Death:
“He observes them [i.e., people] at the times of prayer. If the person is among those who consistently perform it at its appointed time, he [i.e., the Angel of Death] teaches him the testimony that ‘there is no god but Allah, and Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah,’ and drives away Iblīs from him.”⁴

2. Being deluded by Allah’s forbearance (ḥilm Allāh subḥānahu wa-taʿālā):
   A person who persists in sin, assuming that Allah’s patience implies approval or indifference, may be left without divine support at the moment of death.
3. Withholding zakāt:

It is reported from Imām al-Ṣādiq (ʿa):

“Whoever withholds even a qīrāṭ of zakāt – let him die, if he so wishes, as a …[disbeliever].”⁵

4. Delaying ḥajj despite having the means to perform it, until death overtakes one.⁶
   Neglecting this obligation, once the conditions for it are met, is among the signs of spiritual heedlessness that may invite a terrible end.
5. Committing sins and engaging in actions that sever one from obedience to Allah, the Exalted.

It is said that sin leads to forgetfulness – even in this world. So, what then of the dying person, overwhelmed by the intensity of that moment?

As the poet said:

I complained to Wakīʿ about my poor memory,

so he directed me to abandon sin.

He said: Know that knowledge is a light,

and the light of God is not granted to a sinner.⁷

6. Drinking alcohol and consuming forbidden wealth or food.
   Both are repeatedly described in the sources as agents that harden the heart and sever the soul’s bond with Allah (SWT), the Almighty.

 

The Ontological Effect of Food

Here we must address a topic that may be controversial in certain academic and religious circles:

Does food that is truly forbidden (ḥarām fī-l-wāqiʿ) – even when it appears permissible by religious standards (ḥalāl ẓāhiran) due to ignorance or uncertainty – affect the soul negatively?

Take, for example, the one who unknowingly consumes carrion (mīta)⁸ or illicit wealth; might such consumption have a negative effect on a person’s spirituality, such as with respect to the softness of their heart, humility, and perhaps a good end, so that one is able to utter the two testimonies (al-shahādatayn) at the time of death? And does consuming it lead to spiritual ‘dryness’ and hardness of the heart, which may in turn cause one to forget the two testimonies and [fall into] deviation (al-ʿadīlah) at the moment of dying?

In response to this question, we point to the plausibility of this possibility and the merit of exercising precaution in any case. It may even be claimed, quite evidently, that this ontological effect does occur, based on experience. However, this possibility has been met with some objections, as follows:

 

First Objection

The language of the legal narrations which declare certain foods permissible, based on principles such as aṣālat al-ḥilliyya (presumption of permissibility), contain no indication of an ontological effect. If such an effect existed, would it befit the Lawgiver [i.e., Allah SWT] to remain silent about it, especially when the consequence is as grave as apostasy at the time of death?

Response to the First Objection

This objection may be answered on several grounds:

1. Our discussion here lies fundamentally within the ontological domain (al-maqām al-takwīnī), not the legislative one (al-maqām al-tashrīʿī). It is thus not appropriate to extract ontological implications from legal narrations that focus on permissibility and prohibition. The legislative texts may emphasise permissibility (ḥilliyya) while leaving the ontological consequences to be addressed by other kinds of guidance, such as the report of Umm Khālid al-ʿAbdiyya:

Umm Khālid al-ʿAbidiyya once entered upon Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Ṣādiq (a) while I was present. She said:

“May I be your ransom. I suffer from intestinal rumbling, and physicians in Iraq have prescribed a mixture of wine (nabīdh) and toasted flour (sawīq). But I stopped, knowing your disapproval. I wanted to ask you directly.”

The Imām (a) said to her:

“And what stops you from drinking it?”

She replied:

“I have entrusted you with my religion. When I meet Allah, I want to be able to say: Jaʿfar ibn Muḥammad (a) instructed me and forbade me.”

The Imām (a) then turned to me and said:

“O Abū Muḥammad! Do you hear this woman and her questions? By Allah, I do not permit even a drop of it! You will regret it when your soul reaches here [i.e., during the moments of death]…” – and he pointed to his throat.

He repeated this warning three times:

“Do you understand?”

The indication of this narration – even putting aside the analysis of its chain of transmission – is enough to establish reasonable doubt regarding the ontological effects of unknowingly consuming forbidden food, while relying on principles like aṣālat al-ḥilliyya (presumption of permissibility). In this narration, even though the doctors prescribed wine for Umm Khālid al-ʿAbidiyya, but the Imam (a) forbade her from drinking it, possibly because permissible alternatives existed for her medical condition. However, what is interesting is that the Imam (a) then mentions the ontological effect of deviating from faith (al-ʿadīla) at the time of death, perhaps indicating that before coming to him, the cure offered to the like Umm Khālid al-ʿAbidiyya may have at the outset been permissible, as it was being taken for medical cure, on the basis of the laws of necessity (aḥkām al-ḍarūra), but it would still, regardless of its permissibility in such a situation, still have the aforementioned effect. Such hints and allusions are sufficient to awaken spiritual caution, which is precisely what we see in the practice of our scholars: avoiding doubtful foods, refraining from items obtained from individuals who may not care about the permissible and impermissible or the pure and impure, even inducing vomiting after eating such foods, or avoiding the banquets of tyrants out of fear of spiritual contamination.

 

2. The issue here is not dissimilar to the case of genetically modified foods, which probably pose health risks. Would anyone deny that physical harm is an ontological effect? Does the Lawgiver’s silence on the toxicity of a certain mountain herb invalidate the divine law? Surely not – even if eating that unknown plant may result in harm. After all, consuming such foods and liquids that one doesn’t know or consider to be probably harmful falls under the principle of permissibility (aṣālat al-ḥilliyya). This type of scenario is where the importance of precaution becomes apparent.

 

3. Although general rulings in such matters fall under principles like sūq al-muslimīn (trusting the Muslim marketplace), aṣālat al-ṭahāra (presumption of purity), and aṣālat al-ḥilliyya (presumption of permissibility), there is no contradiction in the Lawgiver remaining silent on a possibility that does not constitute a legislative necessity.

Indeed, if there were no ontological difference between truly forbidden food and truly lawful food – once both are treated as ḥalāl on legal grounds – then why do some narrations distinguish between the food of the prophets and that of others?

One narration reports that someone said in the presence of Imām al-Ṣādiq (a):

“O Allah, I ask You for “good sustenance (rizqan ṭayyiban).”9

The Imām (a) replied:

“Far, far from it! That is the food of the prophets. Rather, ask your Lord for sustenance that will not lead to punishment on the Day of Resurrection. Far, far indeed! Allah says, “O messengers, eat of the good things and act righteously.”10

 

4. To be clear: we are not claiming that the consumption of such food is the sole and complete cause (ʿillah tāmma) of a bad end. Nor are we accusing the Sacred Lawgiver – or the scriptural proofs – of falling short in their guidance. Rather, we argue that such food consumption may influence one’s willpower, spiritual resolve, or desire for comfort. But in the end, it is the voluntary actions of the human being – obedience and sin – that determine their fate.

The punishment for al-ʿadīla and an evil end comes as a result of one’s deeds, not a lack of free will. A person still perceives themselves as having choice, and their self-consciousness confirms this. Thereat, this capacity for moral choice is exactly what the School of the Ahl al-Bayt (a) affirms in its doctrine of al-amr bayna al-amrayn (“the matter between two matters”),3 not the exaggerated view of delegation (tafwīḍ) implied by this objection.

 

5. As for the claim that “if such an ontological effect exists, the Lawgiver would be obliged to mention it” – this is mistaken. Such a demand implies assigning responsibilities to the Divine Legislator and us as His creation imposing obligations on Him. Can anyone truly insist that Allah ‘must’ disclose all ontological consequences at all times – especially after He has already warned, urged caution, and promised not to hold anyone accountable except for what their own hands have earned?

No one has the authority to impose such an obligation on Allah, Exalted is He. Nevertheless, we argue that Allah the Exalted, has explained that effects do occur upon the soul, as indicated by the texts of restraint and precaution, and as shown by experience and in the observable laws of creation (aḥkām ʿālam al-takwīn).

 

Second Objection

If the consumption of these foods truly had an ontological effect, then the narrations in general would have clearly mentioned it. Yet, we find no such reference in the corpus of narrations, neither in legislative narations nor otherwise.

 

Response

This was already addressed earlier that such narrations do exist. One can argue that the narrations have not been entirely silent on the issue of the ontological effect, even if we may not be able to present in the scope of this article a comprehensive survey of all texts that urge caution and restraint. However, we can refer to narrations like:

“There is reproach [and blame] in doubtful matters.”^{12 13}

As previously explained, the standard here is the presence of a rational probability (iḥtimāl ʿaqlī). This is not an issue of obligatory devotion (taʿabbud) in which we simply restrict ourselves to the explicit directives of the narrations, only, without contemplating the underlying basis and implications. If that were the case, what meaning would there be in reproaching someone for engaging in doubtful matters – so long as those matters still fall under the principle of permissibility (aṣālat al-ḥilliyya)?

One may claim that the aforementioned “doubts” for which there is “reproach” are not cases of ambiguous matters (shubuhāt), which we are discussing, but rather of cases of non-detailed knowledge (ʿilm ijmālī),¹⁴ that in itself is binding (munajjiz). Although, this claim is refutable because, insofar as non-detailed knowledge is authoritative proof (ḥujja) and binding, it is a basis for deserving punishment, not just “reproach,” which the narration about doubtful matters mentions.

Thereat, the very fact that there is reproach in committing doubtful actions or consuming that which is doubtful confirms that even morally or spiritually ambiguous cases may bear consequence.

 

(Follow this space next week for the following part of this interesting article)

(Next week: Renouncing Faith at the Time of Death – Part 3

The Ontological Effects of Food continued.)

 

Footnotes:

[1] ʿAlī al-Namāzī al-Shāhrūdī, Mustadrak Safīnat al-Biḥār. Vol. 7, p. 122.

[2] Al-Tabrīzī al-Anṣārī, al-Lumʿah al-Bayḍāʾ. pp. 33–34.

[3] ʿAbbās al-Qummī, Manāzil al-Ākhira. p. 31.

[4] Ibid., p. 32, quoting Biḥār al-Anwār.

[5] Ibid., p. 36, quoting Safīnat al-Biḥār (Zakāt), v.1, p. 551.

[6] Ibid., p. 36.

[7] Translator’s note: This is a poem traditionally attributed to al- Shāfiʿī, describing how his teacher Wakīʿ ibn al-Jarrāḥ advised him that sins affect memory and knowledge.

[8] Translator’s note: carrion: an animal that died naturally or improperly slaughtered, therefore not permissible to eat.

[9] Holy Qurʾān: 23:51.

[10] Al-Ṭūsī. al-Amālī. p. 678, ḥadīth no. 17.

[11] This is in reference to the belief of delegation or coercion, which was a matter of debate among early Muslims, in the sense that is a human being totally free in their actions, or are we coerced by Allah (SWT) in our actions. Ahl al-Bayt (a) explain that the parable of free will and Divine Control is like a person who raises their leg; while they raise one leg, they cannot simultaneously raise the other. So is a human being regarding their actions, whereby one may be faced by certain circumstances out of their control, but doing an action in that situation is based on one’s own will, just like a person can choose which of their two legs they wish to lift.

[12] Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī. Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 44, p. 139.

[13] I.e., that which is doubtful from the perspective of rational probability, and not doubts arising from an irrational basis.

[14] ʿIlm ijmālī, i.e., non-detailed knowledge, such as knowing that water in one of the two glasses in front of me is impure. Here, according to Islamic rulings, one may not drink water from either of them, nor can they use them to perform wuḍūʾ. In other words, this non-detailed knowledge becomes binding, as it entails the prohibition of using the water for drinking and wuḍūʾ.